THE PROBLEM
The draft is supposed to help bad teams. It gives the worst teams the best odds at the top pick. The problem is that it also gives bad teams a direct incentive to lose games. Every loss improves your lottery position, so the rational move is often to stop competing.
The 2019 odds flattening was supposed to fix this. It didn't. The tank didn't go away, it just spread. Teams still push to secure a high pick because the current rules prevent a team from falling more than five spots in the lottery, so every position up the standings has real value. Since 2019, 11 of 28 top-four picks went to teams with seventh-or-worse lottery odds. Instead of one or two teams racing to last, 8 to 12 teams now hover in the gray zone where marginal losses help and full effort is irrational. Adam Silver called it worse than ever at the 2026 All-Star Weekend.
THE DRAFT SCORE
A lottery ranking built from three inputs: how bad your organization has been over the past two years, how hard you compete against peers right now, and your current record. The goal is to reward teams that have genuinely struggled over time while removing the incentive to tank.
40%
Priors
Your average league rank over the two seasons before this one. Locked before opening night. Nothing you do this season changes it. A team that was bottom-five for two years carries that history regardless of how they play now.
35%
MOV
Average point differential against other lottery teams. Margin matters, not just wins and losses. Pulling starters, coasting in the fourth quarter, losing by 25 instead of 3: all of it shows up here and hurts your score.
25%
Record
Standard bad-record credit, normalized within the lottery pool. Worst record scores highest on this component. At 25% weight it can't override the other two, which is what keeps tanking from being a viable strategy.
// Teams ranked by draft score, then assigned pre-2019 steep odds. #1 gets 25.0%. The gap between #1 and #5 is 16.2 percentage points. //
[ BLOWOUT CAP ]
Each game's margin is capped at +/-20 before being averaged into the season total. A 40-point blowout counts the same as a 20-point win. Without this, one outlier game can meaningfully skew a team's full-season average and distort their draft score position.
[ INJURY REBALANCE ]
When a team loses a star player to long-term injury, weight shifts from priors toward record. Their bad current season gets more credit, since a healthy-team priors comparison is less fair. Indiana qualified in the 2025-26 example set because of Haliburton.
INCENTIVE STRUCTURE
// Current system: one lever //
The current system has one input: your record. The playbook is simple. Trade productive veterans at the deadline, rest healthy players under vague injury designations, deploy developmental lineups, and accept losses. Nothing before this year matters, and how hard you play doesn't matter either.
The post-2019 flat odds were meant to reduce the worst tanking. They did reduce the sprint to absolute last place, but the incentive to be generically terrible stayed intact. Third-worst gets 14.0% odds. Sixth-worst gets 9.0%. Tenth-worst gets 3.0%. The gap is still large enough to make tanking rational for a lot of teams.
// This model: three levers pulling against each other //
Priors at 40% are frozen before the season starts. A GM wakes up on opening night already knowing this number, and no roster decision or game outcome changes it. A mid-season teardown has almost no effect on priors. The team that traded away their stars in February still carries two years of competitive history that pushes them down the draft score ranking.
MOV at 35% rewards effort continuously. It's the largest in-season component, bigger than record. A team down 10 in the fourth quarter of a February game against a lottery opponent has a real reason to fight back. Cutting that deficit from -10 to -3 moves the number. Pulling starters in a close pool game has a measurable cost. That's different from every game that exists under the current system.
Record at 25% keeps the fairness floor. The worst teams still get credit for being worst. But at 25% it can't override priors and MOV combined. A team with two terrible prior seasons and strong MOV can rank above a team with the worst record but recent success and poor effort against peers.
The tension is the point. To maximize the draft score you need bad priors (can't change), high MOV (requires effort), and a bad record (works against effort). You can't optimize all three at once. At 35% vs 25%, effort beats tanking on the margin.
GAME THEORY
// The in-season tank: net negative //
A team that tanks from 35 wins to 20 wins gains roughly +0.05 on the record component. But their MOV drops badly. Tanking lineups get blown out, and a drop from -2.0 to -9.0 pool MOV costs around -0.12 through the 35% weight. Priors don't move. Net: approximately -0.07. Tanking costs more than it gains.
The math holds because MOV at 35% is bigger than record at 25%. Any action that improves record while hurting MOV will come out negative. Tanking is that action.
// Selective effort: smart but hard to execute //
The smarter play is to compete hard against lottery teams (boosting MOV) while resting players against elite teams (accepting losses that help record without hurting pool MOV). In theory this improves both components at once.
The problem is the pool moves around. Play-in boundaries shift all season. A team you rest against in January as the 5-seed could collapse into the lottery by April. That rest game then becomes a -20 blowout against a pool opponent that tanks your MOV average. Under a win/loss system, you take one loss. Under MOV, you take a -20 result that drags down your season average. The magnitude of the mistake matters.
The rational response: compete against any team that might end up in the lottery pool. That's roughly seeds 6-12 in each conference. When it's unclear, play hard. The downside of accidentally resting against a pool team outweighs the upside.
// The three-year rebuild: exploit or just good strategy? //
The closest thing to gaming this model is also what a real rebuild should look like. Tear down deliberately over two years: trade veterans, avoid stopgap free agents, develop young players, accept losing. Build bad priors. Then in the target year, compete hard against peers. The locked priors do the heavy lifting while strong MOV pushes the score higher.
That's not a loophole, it's the intended behavior. A team going through a genuine rebuild earns lottery equity over time and then cashes it in while playing competitive basketball. The exploit year requires trying harder against other bad teams, which is exactly what the system is designed to reward.
The current system only needs one bad season. This model needs three years of organizational decline and a 75% miss rate even at #1 odds. Most front offices don't have the runway for that. Houston ran this path (17W, 20W, 22W, then 41W) and earned their best lottery positions while playing competitive basketball. That's the whole point.
// The NBA middle class //
The current system has almost nothing for teams in the 30 to 42 win range. They're bad enough to miss the playoffs but not bad enough to get meaningful lottery odds. They sit in the 8th to 14th range of the current lottery, collecting 0.5% to 6.0% odds and watching true tankers leapfrog them.
This model changes that math. A team that has been stuck in this zone for two or three years builds significant priors. If they also compete hard against pool opponents and keep their MOV up, the draft score can push them into the top five regardless of their current record. Charlotte this year (39-34, model #3) is that exact team. Houston 2024 (41 wins, model #1) is another.
Under the current system, a middling competitive team has two rational options: push for the play-in and hope to get lucky, or blow it up and tank. This model adds a third: stay competitive, build history, and earn real lottery equity without destroying what you have. That's a better deal for the fans, the players, and the product.
// The deadline seller: neutralized //
A mid-season sell is close to useless under this model. The team's prior two years were competitive, so priors are weak. Post-deadline they get blown out by everyone, so MOV craters. Record improves, but 25% weight doesn't cover the other two.
Houston 2024 shows this in reverse: 41 wins, nearly missed the lottery, ranked #1 in the draft score because of two catastrophic prior seasons and strong pool MOV. A 46-win team that sold at the deadline would have a prior rank around 11 and finish in the bottom half of the pool regardless.
WHO GAINS
Six draft classes (2021-2026) at 40/35/25 with a 15-team pool. The teams that move up most are ones that were bad for multiple years before the current season and still compete against their peers.
// Teams that have been stuck for years //
Charlotte 2026 — +12 spots, +24.5% odds
39-36, 13th by record in the current lottery pool at 0.5% odds. Their priors reflect a 2-year average rank near 28 (among the league's worst in 2023-24 and 2024-25) and a +5.8 vs-pool MOV, best in the pool. The current system sees a team with a winning record and gives them almost nothing. The draft score sees a franchise that spent two straight years at the bottom and is now competing. They jump to #1 at 25.0%.
Houston 2024 — +11 spots, +23.5% odds
41 wins, 12th in the current system at 1.5% odds. Their priors show a 2-year average rank of 29.0 (20 wins in 2021-22, 22 wins in 2022-23) and +3.8 pool MOV. The draft score sees a franchise clawing back from two of the worst seasons in recent NBA history while actively competing. They jump to #1.
Oklahoma City 2023 — +10 spots, +18.4% odds
40 wins, #12 by record. Priors show a 2-year average rank of 26.5 (22 wins and 24 wins) and +2.0 MOV. The draft score recognizes that OKC earned their lottery position through years of real losing and pushes them to #2 at 19.9%.
San Antonio 2025 — +7 spots, +19.0% odds
34 wins, 8th by record in the current system. Their priors reflect two straight bottom-tier seasons, and their competitive profile against lottery teams kept them far above where pure record would place them. The model pushed them to #1 at 25.0%, treating them as a team with real accumulated need rather than just another middling lottery entrant.
[ PATTERN ]
Teams that gained 5+ spots in all six draft classes shared two things: a prior 2-year average rank above 18 and positive or near-positive pool MOV. The draft score rewards the team that has been bad for years and is still trying. That's the archetype the current system consistently undervalues.
WHO LOSES
// The one-year collapser //
Houston 2021 — -13 spots, -13.5% odds
The most extreme punishment in the dataset. Worst record in the league (17 wins), #1 in the current system at 14.0%. But their priors show a 2-year average rank of 8.0 (53 wins in 2018-19, 44 wins in 2019-20) and a -11.5 pool MOV. The draft score dropped them to #14 at 0.5%. Houston's tank was one of the most discussed in recent NBA history. The current system handed them #1 odds. This model gave them almost nothing because their history remembered who they were.
Sacramento 2026 — -6 spots, -12.9% odds
19-57, tied for the worst record in the league. The current system gives them 14.0% at #4. But their priors show a 2-year average rank around 16 (46-win team in 2023-24, 40-win play-in team in 2024-25) and a -4.7 vs-pool MOV. A recently competitive franchise in freefall, not a team that has been stuck at the bottom. The draft score drops them to #10 at 1.1%.
Indiana 2026 — -9 spots, -13.2% odds
The Pacers went to the Finals in June 2025. Now 17-58, tied for the worst record in the league. The current system gives them 14.0% at #2. Their priors reflect a 2-year average rank around 11, back-to-back strong seasons. The draft score drops them to #11 at 0.8%. One bad year after two good ones does not earn top lottery equity.
// The non-competitor //
Utah 2025 — -7 spots, -11.2% odds
17 wins, worst in the league, #1 in the current system at 14.0%. But their priors show a 2-year average rank of 22.5 and the worst pool MOV (-11.8). Priors weren't strong enough to carry them. They dropped to #8 at 2.8%. Having the worst record this year doesn't guarantee top odds if the two years before weren't bad enough and you're not competing against peers.
THE 40/35/25 SPLIT
The split was designed so that MOV is the largest in-season component. Of the 60% of the draft score determined during the season, 58% comes from MOV and 42% from record. On the margin, competing always beats tanking.
[ TANKING MATH ]
// tanking loses ground //
[ COMPETING MATH ]
// effort wins //
Why not push MOV even higher? Because priors need to stay the largest single component. A team with two catastrophic prior seasons has earned their lottery position regardless of how they play this year. Drop priors below 35-40% and a single strong MOV season can overcome years of real suffering. The 40% floor keeps organizational history as the anchor.
STEEP ODDS
The pre-2019 odds table turns positional shifts into large probability swings. Under current flat odds, moving from #3 to #1 is worth 0.0 percentage points since all three share 14.0%. Under steep odds, it's worth 9.4 points. The gap between #1 and #5 is 16.2 points, the difference between a 1-in-4 shot at a franchise player and a 1-in-17 shot.
Steep odds only make sense if you trust the system doing the ranking. Under the current model, the top-ranked team is whoever had the worst record, which makes flat odds more defensible since the ranking isn't doing much. Under the draft score, position #1 reflects two years of organizational history and current competitive effort. That's a more meaningful judgment, and concentrated odds at the top reward it more accurately.
The two go together. Better ranking method plus steeper odds means the team that most deserves the top pick has a real shot at getting it.
| Year | Team | Direction | Positions | Odds shift |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Charlotte | Gain | +12 | +24.5% |
| 2024 | Houston | Gain | +11 | +23.5% |
| 2025 | San Antonio | Gain | +7 | +19.0% |
| 2023 | Oklahoma City | Gain | +10 | +18.4% |
| 2025 | San Antonio | Gain | +7 | +19.0% |
| 2021 | Houston | Loss | -13 | -13.5% |
| 2026 | Indiana | Loss | -9 | -13.2% |
| 2022 | Houston | Loss | -9 | -12.9% |
| 2021 | Orlando | Loss | -6 | -12.3% |
| 2026 | Sacramento | Loss | -6 | -12.9% |
2025-26 FINAL BOARD
The regular season is complete, so the 2025-26 example is no longer a moving target. Indiana and Washington finished tied for the worst record at 17-58. Under the current system they sit near the top of the board with 14.0% odds each. Under this model, Washington lands #2 while Indiana falls to #11. Charlotte, a 39-36 team near the back of the lottery field by record, rises to #1. Here is what the final picture looks like.
A winning record, 13th by record in the pool, 0.5% odds in the current system. Their priors show two straight years near the bottom of the league, and a +5.8 vs-pool MOV was the best in the final pool. They have been bad for years and competed hard. The model gives them #1 at 25.0%.
One of the worst records in the league and years of organizational bottom-dwelling in the priors. Their final vs-pool MOV was -3.8, which holds them from #1, but the depth of their prior history is real enough to land #2. The model and the current system largely agree here, just with different reasoning.
Tied for the worst record in the league, 14.0% odds in the current system. Their priors show two recent winning seasons (46 wins in 2023-24, 40 wins in 2024-25) and a -4.7 vs-pool MOV. A recently competitive team in freefall. The draft score drops them to #10 at 1.1%.
Finals team in June 2025, tied for the worst record in the league by season end. The current system gives them 14.0% at #2. Priors reflect back-to-back strong seasons, and a -6.0 vs-pool MOV confirms they were not competing against peers. The model drops them to #11 at 0.8%. One bad year after two great ones does not earn top lottery equity.
Charlotte at 39-36 ranks above Indiana at 17-58. Charlotte has been bad for years and is fighting. Indiana was elite last year and is not competing now. Record tells one story. History and effort tell another.
2025 MODEL VS REALITY
Dallas entered the 2025 lottery with 1.8% odds at #1, tied for the 11th-worst record. They won, taking Cooper Flagg first overall in one of the bigger lottery upsets in recent memory.
Under this model, Dallas would have ranked #9 in the draft score (priors showing a 2-year average rank of 13.5, +3.0 pool MOV) and received 1.7% odds. Similar to their actual odds but for different reasons. San Antonio would have been #1 at 25.0% and Charlotte #2 at 19.9%, both with priors above rank 25 and competitive MOV showing sustained futility.
The model doesn't prevent upsets. A 1.7% team can still win. But it shifts the baseline odds toward teams with real multi-year struggles, so the expected outcomes are more fair even when the actual outcome is random.
VS CURRENT SYSTEM
| Metric | Draft Score Model | Current NBA |
|---|---|---|
| Top pick odds | 25.0% | 14.0% |
| Primary in-season signal | vs-pool MOV | Record |
| Lookback window | 2-year frozen rank | Current season only |
| Tanking payoff | Net negative | Direct reward |
| Effort measurement | Point differential vs peers | Not measured |
| Mid-season tank value | Reduced (priors frozen) | High |
| One-year collapser reward | Low (recent history counts) | Full reward |
| NBA middle class equity | High (priors reward multi-year struggle) | Near zero |
SUMMARY
Priors are untouchable.
40% of the draft score is locked before opening night. No in-season decision changes it. This removes mid-season tanking as a real strategy and forces front offices to reckon with their organizational history.
Effort is the biggest in-season factor.
MOV at 35% is larger than record at 25%. Of the 60% determined during the season, more than half rewards how hard you compete. There is no point in any game where the smart move is to stop trying.
Tanking loses ground.
Deliberately losing costs more through MOV damage than it gains through record improvement. The only viable long-term gaming path requires three years of commitment and produces competitive basketball during the target year.
Across six draft classes: teams with genuine multi-year futility and competitive effort gained an average of 5.5 positions and 8.5 percentage points in lottery odds. Teams that ran one-year tanks or fell from recent success lost an average of 6.5 positions and 8.8 points. The model moves lottery equity from strategic losers to sustained sufferers.
// examples last updated Apr 18, 2026 //